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Left to right: William Fry, John
Weakland, Gregory Bateson, and
Jay Haley of the Palo Alto Group,
with a tape recorder used to 
document sessions with patients,
ca. 1955. A diagram on the black-
board models communicative
patterns in a three-member 
family of F[ather], M[other], and
C[hild]. Courtesy Don D. Jackson
Archive, University of Louisiana 
at Monroe.
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The Family as Machine: 
Film, Infrastructure, 
and Cybernetic Kinship 
in Suburban America
BERNARD DIONYSIUS GEOGHEGAN
In the 1950s an interdisciplinary team of researchers associated with
anthropologist Gregory Bateson embarked on a collective effort to
dethrone psychoanalysis with film and magnetic tape. More surpris-
ing than their mission has been its resounding success. By the end of
the decade Bateson and his colleagues around the San Francisco Bay
Area had established the rudiments of a psychotherapeutic approach
that eschewed the search for traumas buried in the individual
unconscious in favor of investigations into mental illness as the
result of interpsychic distortions among individuals interacting in
small groups. The group of particular interest to the Palo Alto Group
(as Bateson and his colleagues came to be known) was also among
the most sacred of postwar social institutions in the United States:
the nuclear family. While American popular culture and social 
science were celebrating the tight-knit nuclear family as a foundation
of national strength and moral rectitude, the Palo Alto Group was
developing a portrait of the family as a kind of post-Fordist factory
for the production and management of psychic well-being. Their
claims rested on the intricate analysis of films, photographs, audio
recordings, and transcripts said to reveal hierarchies of communica-
tive codes (e.g., denotative, metalinguistic, metacommunicative)
structuring everyday interactions such as mealtimes, the bathing of
babies, and even play among animals. This notion of mental illness
springing from communicative errors gave rise to a new school of
mental health therapy that recast psychotherapists as technicians 
of the family circuit and ushered in an ensemble of cameras, audio
recorders, architectures, games, and techniques available to thera-
pists for managing communications in the family. Thus, the family
as cybernetic machine was born.
The cybernetic family is perhaps the most durable artifact spun
off by cybernetics. Whereas cybernetics gradually lost credibility in
fields such as engineering, linguistics, and sociology in the course of
the 1960s, the account of the therapist-as-technician offered by the
Palo Alto Group has thrived in the mental health profession under
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the methodological banners of family therapy and brief therapy.1 Its
conceptual tenets have provided inspiration to far-flung intellectual
movements, including the antipsychiatry movement, neoliberal pro-
grams for the deinstitutionalization of mental patients, and cultural
critics’ diagnoses of schizophrenics’ scrambled communications as
symptomatic of the logical contradictions of late capitalism. Iterations
of these techniques can likely be found at the reader’s nearest 
mental health clinic. Indeed, anyone who has gone through ten or
twelve sessions of cognitive behavioral therapy may count herself an
extended member of the cybernetic family.2
This article examines the production of the cybernetic family (and
the productivity of the cybernetic family) through media practices
implemented by Bateson and his associates in psychiatry, anthro-
pology, and the visual arts. While the cybernetic origins of the Palo
Alto Group are no secret, the origins and consequences of this link—
indeed, the very meaning of cybernetic in this context—remain
obscure.3 Often the conflation of Bateson’s research with the fabu-
lous techno-imaginaries of cybernetics and computing has produced
misleading portraits of the work of the Palo Alto Group as an offshoot
of high-tech digital worlds or as a commentary on the psychic 
costs of living in information societies. Such accounts overshadow a 
far more interesting and composite media genealogy of film, tape
recorders, photography, paper transcriptions, laboratory architec-
tures, and suburban infrastructures that produced the cybernetic
systems devised by Bateson and his associates.4 Along with the over-
shadowing of these multimedial origins, the work of Bateson’s 
collaborators—such as painter and experimental filmmaker Weldon
Kees—have also disappeared from histories of the Palo Alto Group.5
The multiplicity of media and personnel present at the group’s origins
imbued its work with the reach and potentiality later actualized in
its appropriation by visual artists of the 1960s and 1970s and by the
gurus of Silicon Valley cyberculture.6
Working with previously unconsidered archival materials (largely
unpublished due to their status as medical records), this article rein-
troduces the extended network of human beings, instruments, and
media responsible for what I call the “Palo Alto Apparatus” and posits
that the remarkable endurance of the cybernetic family stems from
its robust construction as a multimedia machine. For in contrast to
most cybernetic speculation of the 1950s and 1960s, the cybernetic
family was not modeled on analogies to media and technology; rather,
it was itself a functioning media technology composed of film strips,
feedback loops, photographs, studios, audio recordings, mirrors,
mothers, fathers, children, and therapists. Within this ensemble, two
technical artifacts in particular—namely, ethnographically deployed
film and the postwar suburbs—furnished key technical affordances
Geoghegan | The Family as Machine: Film, Infrastructure, and Cybernetic Kinship in Suburban America 73
for producing the cybernetic family. The visually rich, serially struc-
tured frames of film furnished therapists with data series suitable 
for cybernetic and information analysis, while postwar American
suburbs arranged families into semiautonomous libidinal systems
suitable for technical description and modulation. In offering an 
initial analysis of the production of the cybernetic family, this article
models the theoretical proposition that media history offers invalu-
able tools for understanding the production of a wide range of 
cultural forms that, though remote from “mass media” as such, are
irremediably shaped by the intervention of media-technical practices,
instruments, and inscriptions.7
The Rise of “Psybernetics”
As the cast-off technologies of World War II trickled down to civilian
life in the 1940s and 1950s, state-sponsored care for the mentally 
ill emerged as a popular arena for their repurposed application. MIT
mathematician Norbert Wiener blazed what would soon became a
well-worn path from schools of engineering to departments of psy-
chology.8 In a 1948 article for Scientific American that introduced
cybernetics to the American public, he defined the new field as com-
bining “under one heading the study of what in a human context is
sometimes described as thinking and in engineering is known as
control and communication,” adding that “[t]he technique of the
psychoanalyst . . . is perfectly consistent with the cybernetic point of
view.”9 Engineers and human scientists jostled for priority in realiz-
ing this consistency. The founder of information theory, engineer
Claude Shannon, devoted his private hours to writing a monograph
dedicated to the study of the informational laws that governed the
human mind, titled “Brains, Minds, Machines.”10 Computer designer
and game theorist John von Neumann felt these applications to be so
promising that he spent the final weeks of his life dictating the chapters
of The Computer and the Brain from his deathbed.11 These and other
works inspired scholars working in the mental sciences proper—for
instance, American psychologist George Miller and French psycho-
analyst Jacques Lacan—to apply cybernetics, game theory, and infor-
mation theory to the construction of machinic theories of mind.12
This gradual application of cybernetics to psychic management—
which I suggest terming psybernetics—reflected the interrelated 
production of mental illness and media technologies in midcentury
America. As World War II came to an end, media technologies and
armies of mentally damaged veterans flooded civilian life.13 From the
early to the late 1940s the number of mental patients in the care of
the Veterans Administration doubled, with 60 percent of the 74,000
patients in its care in 1946 suffering from neuropsychiatric disor-
ders.14 Moreover, social scientists’ conception of fascism as psychic
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pathology (and of democracy as resilient mental equanimity) moti-
vated a new focus on “mental health” as a suitable matter for state
investment. The National Mental Health Act of 1946 and the found-
ing of the National Institute of Mental Health in 1949 responded to
this emerging battlefront in the American psyche. Even so, the crisis
of the mentally ill seemed to grow inexorably. By the mid-1950s the
number of mental health patients in the United States had peaked at
half a million, with mental patients filling 50 percent of all hospital
beds nationwide, as much as 10 percent of some states’ entire annual
budgets going toward mental health care, and the American Psychiatric
Association predicting billions of additional dollars would be needed
to confront the growing mental health crisis.15
This postwar demand for mental health care mapped onto—and
was in a sense given form by—a tempest of progressive and reactionary
political forces allied in their skepticism about state-run mental
health care. A spate of journalistic exposés of asylums in the late
1940s—such as the devastating multipage layout “Bedlam 1946” that
appeared in LIFE in May 1946 and Albert Deutsch’s 1947 book The
Shame of the States—revealed abominable conditions prevailing in
many asylums, which often warehoused hundreds of patients soused
in their own filth for years and years on end.16 In the decade that 
followed, a flurry of studies on mental hospitals, such as Erving
Goffman’s Asylums (composed under the aegis of the National Institute
of Mental Health), attributed symptoms of mental illnesses to the
deleterious effects of institutionalization itself.17 This politically pro-
gressive opprobrium directed at institutionalized mental health care
found a corollary on the political right, where groups such as the
John Birch Society and the Daughters of the American Revolution
attributed the growth in mental hospitals to communist plots imple-
mented by psychiatrists of Jewish and European extraction (allega-
tions investigated in 1948 by Congress’s House Un-American Activities
Committee).18 These two movements set the stage for a politically broad
critique of institutionalized mental health care.
Left- and right-wing criticisms of psychiatry from this period
comported with a wider mutation underway in twentieth-century
psychiatry. Throughout the nineteenth and the first half of the twen-
tieth centuries, the dominant settings of interwar mental health care
in the West, such as psychoanalytic sofas and urban asylums, had
relied on a model of psychic containment aimed at producing an
autonomous and rational self. That ebbing epoch of medical (as well
as industrial and political) discipline had depended on constraint,
expertise, and the confessional reform of individual bodies.19
Psybernetics, however, devised workable alternatives to institutional
enclosure based on new etiologies and an interpsychic conception
of self.
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The leading architect for the psybernetic redistribution of mental
illness was Bateson and his extended network of colleagues. Rejecting
enclosure (i.e., the asylum) and abandoning the goal of producing 
a self-contained autonomous psyche, they identified families, com-
munities, domestic spaces, and nonverbal communication as compo-
nents of a decentralized matrix that produced—and was capable of
resolving—mental illness. In doing so, they proposed the substitu-
tion of the old system of experts and asylums with a new system of
technicians and suburban homes.
The Palo Alto Apparatus
An outline of the Palo Alto approach to psychotherapy appeared in
the 1956 essay “Toward a Theory of Schizophrenia,” coauthored 
by Bateson and his Palo Alto Veterans Administration Hospital 
colleagues Don D. Jackson, Jay Haley, and John Weakland.20 Later
characterized by Haley as “a preliminary report which summarized
the common agreement of the research team on the broad outlines of
a communication theory of the origin and nature of schizophrenia,”
the paper argued that mental illness springs from communicative
contradictions in the family, which the authors termed “double
binds.”21 As an example of the double bind, the authors cited the case
of a schizophrenic patient whose mother verbally demanded affection
from her son but physically withdrew when he embraced her. Bateson
and his team claimed schizophrenic symptoms—such as a confusion
between literal and metaphorical levels of communication—were
not inherently pathological but, on the contrary, provided a tactical
(and rational) resolution of double binds. Where gesture and speech
conflicted, or affective and discursive levels of communication clashed,
the schizophrenic produced a mash-up of interpretive frames that rec-
onciled competing levels of meaning. From this analytical perspective,
the best method for curing schizophrenia was to engineer a change 
in the familial patterns of communication responsible for its genesis.
The double-bind hypothesis depended on two strategic appara-
tuses of cybernetic communication. First, the hypothesis rested upon
on a proposed isomorphism between families and media-technical
systems (such as telegraphy), which was produced by a technodis-
cursive apparatus comprising media technologies and key conceptual
arenas, such as the Macy Conferences on Cybernetics, that translated
media-technical knowledge into the social sciences. On the basis 
of this exchange Jackson could claim, in the knowledge that game 
theory and computing machinery furnished an implicit framework
for rendering such a claim intelligible, that “the family is a rule-
governed system” characterized by a “patterning of behaviors [that]
can be abstracted as a governing principle of family life.”22 What made
this exchange an apparatus (dispositif )—that is, a heterogeneous
76 Grey Room 66
system responding to an urgent political need—was psybernetics’
inscription in the postwar health crisis, as well as cybernetics’ emer-
gence through the patronage of technocratic institutions, including
the Rockefeller Foundation and the Josiah Macy Jr. Foundation
(sponsors of the Palo Alto Group from 1952 to 1954 and 1955 to 1962
respectively).23 These and other private foundations embraced cyber-
netics as a purportedly neutral scientific tool for resolving social and
political problems.24 The notion of the family as a technoscientific
system gained traction within this network of private foundations
supporting market-friendly technological solutions to social prob-
lems. Domestic discontent became a problem of engineering improved
communication, not in wires but in people. This combination of dis-
course, machinery, and strategy constituted the first apparatus of
cybernetic communication.
Second, the double-bind hypothesis itself modeled the construc-
tion of a new technodiscursive apparatus of communication for 
capturing and defining mental illness in terms of “characteristic
sequential patterns” within the family.25 From the mid-1950s through
the early 1960s, members of the Palo Alto Group devised an array of
media-technical systems to capture and analyze these patterns. Their
most notable system was the structured interview, a cultural-technical
assemblage of cameras, microphones, architectural design, scripts,
and games to aid therapists in “scanning for patterns” in families.26
Most often this system was used in interviews of families with a
member labeled “schizophrenic.” In its
simplest form the structured interview con-
sisted of standardized questions posed by 
a family therapist. These questions gov-
erned (or “structured”) topics of discus-
sion, the likely order of family members’
responses, and the presence or priority of
particular family members (or the thera-
pist) during discussion. The paradigmatic
structured interview distributed the family
in a horseshoe shape around a circular
table, family members facing inward, with
the therapist and movie camera positioned
at the opening end of the horseshoe.
Although occasionally performed at home,
structured interviews typically took place
in a purpose-built room that included a
table, chairs, a fireplace, and a one-way
mirror that concealed the camera and
observing therapists.27
The structured interview redistributed
Top: John Weakland (far right)
conducting a structured inter-
view at home with members 
of a family, including the son
(second from right), labeled
schizophrenic, 1957. Frame
enlargement. Faces have 
been concealed to protect 
the identities of the subjects.
Courtesy Don D. Jackson
Archive, University of Louisiana
at Monroe.
Bottom: John Weakland (back
to camera) conducting a struc-
tured interview with members
of a family in a purpose-built
interview room, with a one-way
mirror to conceal the camera
and observing therapists, at the
Mental Research Institute, Palo
Alto, 1959. Frame enlargement.
What appears to be a micro-
phone hangs overhead and
what appears to be a fireplace
is installed behind the family.
Faces have been concealed 
to protect the identities of 
the subjects. Courtesy Don D.
Jackson Archive, University of
Louisiana at Monroe.
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the site of diagnosis away from the supposedly traumatized, uncon-
scious interior of an individual patient to a series of binding 
patterns in family interactions that would be disclosed by recording
media.28 The interview unfolded as a series of questions and tasks
presented by the therapist to the family. Responding to these
demands required collective, coordinated activities executed in a
fixed period of time. One iteration of the structured interview asked
family members, individually and in isolation, what they believed
the main problem was in the family. Afterward they would be
brought together in a room, informed of unnamed discrepancies
among their individual accounts, and challenged to reach a collec-
tive conclusion about the true nature of the problem. As they nego-
tiated among themselves, a therapist observed and the camera
documented from behind the one-way mirror in hopes of revealing
double-binding processes in action. “[T]his task,” a member of the
Palo Alto Group explained, “is an adaptation of the game-theoretical
model of the Prisoners’ Dilemma where, as is known, direct com-
munication is made impossible, a decision involving all concerned
has to be reached and the decision is dependent upon the amount 
of trust each partner is prepared to invest in the others.”29 In these
and others tasks it was “not so much the content of their final deci-
sion which has been found to be revealing . . . but whether or not a
decision is reached within the time limits, and the manner in which
it was accomplished.”30 Therapists recorded, transcribed, and
minutely analyzed these transactions for evidence of interpsychic
double binding.
The media setup organized both family performance and scien-
tific observation in these experiments. Therapists called patients’
attention to the recording apparatus to achieve a range of goals,
including policing quarrels, compelling the faithful performance 
of tasks, and identifying the therapist as a
coparticipant rather than an arbiter (the ther-
apists, no less than family members, were sub-
ordinate to the impartial record of the film).31
This last point encouraged family members
to focus on immanent interactions among one
another rather than turn to the therapist as an
external authority. This regulation of partici-
pants’ performance redounded on the thera-
pists themselves, who found in celluloid 
and magnetic tape an objective record that
short-circuited the temptation to psychoana-
lytic interpretation. “The ultimate verification
of typical family patterns,” group member
Haley explained, “would seem to be possible
Photograph taken from behind
the one-way mirror of an 
interview room at the Mental
Research Institute, Palo Alto.
Captioned as “Schizophrenia
patient Ida Friedberg (end of
table) and parents in a Palo 
Alto therapy session. Ida, 35,
recently was released from a
mental hospital. Her parents
give high praise to the new
treatment.” From Milton
Silverman and Margaret
Silverman, “Psychiatry inside
the Family Circle,” Saturday
Evening Post, 28 July 1962.
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only if the family is placed in some experimental situation where the
responses can be recorded by some other means than the quick eye
of an investigator.”32 In this way family members and therapists
became part of a single ensemble regulated by the strategic interven-
tion of a media apparatus.
The coordinating power of the apparatus reached its apex in an
experimental setup for tracking patterns of family cooperation and
competition, devised in partnership with Alexander Bavelas of
MIT’s Group Networks Laboratory. A simple conceit organized the
setup. Psychotherapists instructed members of three-person families
to play a simple game, wherein family members had three rounds of
two minutes each to win points for forming “coalitions” with one
another. These pairs were exclusive—only two people could be in a
coalition at a time—and to win the game, a family member had to
strategically shift back and forth between coalitions with different
family members. For example, if mother formed coalitions only with
son and vice versa (i.e., mother and son never engaging father), then
no one would win the game because mother and son would have the
same number of points and father none. This design of the game
imposed a formal pattern on cooperation and competition within
families and, its designers hoped, would allow for scientific com-
parisons of characteristic patterns of coalitions between pathologi-
cal and nonpathological families.
The game complicated matters by not allowing speaking during
three of the four rounds and only brief speech in the fourth round.
Instead, play and alliance building took place by means of an exper-
imental apparatus that structured interactions around a series of
binary selections (not unlike the vacuum tubes of a computer that
reduced complex equations to series of steps governed by a circuit
that was either on or off). This apparatus seated three-member fami-
lies at a table divided into three cubby-like partitions. The walls of
the cubby obstructed family members’ lines of sight, preventing
visual signaling among one other. Instead, communication took
place by means of switches. Each
partition had two buttons, indi-
vidually labeled to designate the
kin member in the adjacent parti-
tion (mother, father, daughter, or
son). When family members from
adjacent cubbies simultaneously
pressed the buttons designating
each other, they formed a coalition
and were awarded a point. Each
cubby had its own mechanical
counter that tracked points won.
Diagram of an apparatus
designed to standardize and
quantify patterns of interaction
in family members in order to
compare the patterns of 
“normal” families with those 
of families with a child labeled
schizophrenic, ca. 1962. The
names on the outside (Child/
Mother/Father) designate the
assigned seating place of said
family member. Partitions divide
the members, while buttons 
on the surface of the tabletop
labeled son, husband, wife, etc.,
could be pressed to ally the
seated person with an adjacent
person. Additional buttons
embedded in the partition and
connected to a bulb permit sig-
naling to the adjacent person 
to request an alliance. A square
mechanical counter toward the
center of each partition tracks
points scored through success-
ful alliance. From Jay Haley,
“Family Experiments: A New
Type of Experimentation,”
Family Processes 1 (1962).
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Two additional buttons allowed members to activate lights in the
adjacent cubby, signaling an invitation to form a coalition. An “event
recorder” in the adjacent “control room” kept a master record of 
all interactions for later analysis and comparison across families.
Apparatuses such as these facilitated a formalist analysis of family
interactions. More important, they performatively reconstituted the
family into a rule-bound system governed by elementary operations
of relay and exchange.
These programming techniques stripped away conversational
semantics to reveal elementary patterns of interaction suitable for
formal description and mathematical analysis. In contrast to psy-
choanalysis, which would have read repetitions, gestures, stutters,
and cross talk in terms of the depths and obfuscations of the psyche,
the Palo Alto Group treated these elements as depthless codes 
governing the binding of a communicative network. Psychoanalytic
depth and repression thus gave way to cybernetic surface and pat-
tern, which could be empirically captured in a material surface of
celluloid and magnetic tape. Indeed, staff members sometimes
divided up the different family members’ spoken lines like roles and
acted them out with one another, because if mental illnesses resided
in patterns of interaction, then even “normal” subjects—so the logic
went—might slip into psychically aberrant roles.33
These methodologies had a peculiarly centrifugal effect on mental
illness. No longer inscribed in the flesh, mental disturbances became
ambulatory—traveling from body to body, without a center, the prop-
erty of ongoing interactions rather than internal states. This shift of
locale corresponded to modifications in documentation and treat-
ment. Recording media gave illness a durable existence in material
traces outside the body; illness no longer resided in tissues of grey
matter but rather in informatic patterns and traces. By means of
recording, these traces could be sped up, slowed down, cut into
pieces, redistributed across distances long and short, and circulated
for analysis through professional journals. In time, these results
could be returned to the patient, on occasion even directly; for
instance, through an encounter with words and images played back
to him or her. But more often the therapists themselves synthesized
these elements and applied their lessons to the family, thereby com-
pleting the circuit of communications, with therapists themselves
becoming the final segment of the feedback loop that reconstituted
the family as a cybernetic system.
Gestural Spacing
The Palo Alto Apparatus emerged from a series of filmic and photo-
graphic investigations on nonverbal communication that Bateson
conducted from 1949 to 1955 in collaboration with Kees and 
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psychiatrist Jurgen Ruesch.34 Bateson had flirted with mental health
research since the 1930s, when the Committee for Research in
Dementia Praecox provided him and his then-wife Margaret Mead
with funding to study causes of the supposedly low incidence of
schizophrenia among Balinese tribes.35 When their marriage broke
up in the late 1940s, Bateson decamped for California, where he
secured an appointment working with Ruesch, a non-Freudian analyst
of Swiss extraction, at the Langley Porter Clinic in San Francisco.
Bateson brought to this work two decisive interests. His burgeoning
interest in communication theory, based on his participation in iter-
ations of the Macy Conferences on Cybernetics (as they later came 
to be known) since 1946, came to organize much of their work.
Bateson’s interest complemented Ruesch’s own growing interest in
communicative theories of mental health. In addition, the “culture
and personality” school of anthropology, with which Bateson became
associated through Mead, had developed an account of personality
as the result of values and practices inculcated by the family in child
rearing. This latter perspective would inform how Bateson and his
colleagues defined communicative processes in the family.
Ruesch and Bateson’s coauthored 1951 monograph Communication:
The Social Matrix of Psychiatry established the rudiments of a cyber-
netic approach founded on the premise that “almost all phenomena
included under the traditional heading of psychopathology are dis-
turbances of communication.”36 The presumption that mental illness
developed in communication demanded a turn away from the
expressions of the solitary disturbed individual in favor of an analy-
sis of interactions between mentally ill patients and the people
around them, including their families and therapists. Ruesch and
Bateson turned to Kees to develop modes of documentation capable
of empirically documenting these interactions. An accomplished
painter and poet, Kees had succeeded Clement Greenberg as the art
critic for The Nation and was an emerging figure in the postwar
experimental film scene taking root in the Bay Area. Like Bateson
and Ruesch, he was a transplant to the area, having come to San
Francisco to escape the East Coast, where he felt stifled by the nascent
New York School of Painting, with which he was identified.
Kees infused his colleagues’ films and writings with an aesthetic
acuity and, rather than seeing the job as just a means to a paycheck,
appeared to have a genuine investment in the prospect of a reformed
approach to psychotherapy. His wife spent time at Langley Porter
Clinic as a patient, and Kees suffered from his own bouts with depres-
sion, culminating in his presumed suicide from the Golden Gate
Bridge, in 1955. His poem “The Clinic,” dedicated to Bateson but
apparently written before he joined the Langley Porter team, offers a
grim portrait of the scenes of electroconvulsive therapy of the period:
Geoghegan | The Family as Machine: Film, Infrastructure, and Cybernetic Kinship in Suburban America 81
When the doctors turn the current on.
The ceiling fries. Waves shimmer from the floor
Where hell spreads thin between the bars.
And then a switch snaps off and it is over
For another day. Close up. Go home.
Calcium chloride, a milligram
Or so, needled into the brain, close to
The infundibulum. Sometimes we sleep for weeks.37
The brooding horror of electrical and chemical intervention evoked
in “The Clinic” hints at the unease Kees, Bateson, and Ruesch shared
for mainstream psychiatry of the period. This acutely felt and inti-
mate investment in the problems of the psychologically unwell
seemed to drive Kees’s efforts as he redirected the experimental
modes of representations honed in poetry, criticism, filmmaking,
and painting toward a reimagination of the psyche itself, as inscribed
in aesthetic flows available for capture and modification through
cinematic reels and photographic rolls.38
One of their major works from this period, the educational film
Communication and Interaction in Three Families (1952), outlines
the trio’s cybernetic approach to the study of the family. A narrator
describes the film as an effort to document what the narrator terms
“small repetitive patterns . . . whose cumulative effect contributes to
character formation.”39 The film, ethnographic in character, docu-
mented nearly imperceptible patterns of gesture and interaction in
the family which, following the culture-and-personality school’s
thinking, they credited with forming individual character. Other
activities filmed during this period included schizophrenic patients
reading Finnegans Wake, “mute mongoloids” interacting in group
settings, suburban mothers spending time at home with mentally ill
children, and seeing-eye dogs undergoing training.40 Bateson attrib-
uted the double-bind thesis to films shot in this period at the San
Francisco Zoo, where he claimed to have found nonverbal cues that
allowed the animals to distinguish between fighting and playing.41
Bateson, Ruesch, and Kees purposed to undertake a cybernetic
analysis of these interactions as revealed in microdetail by celluloid.
According to Ruesch and Kees,
few are trained to look steadily and searchingly at the visual
world and really to see what passes
before the eyes. The nature of action
is inherently transitory. . . . [However,
t]he highly consequential act of
putting a “frame” around a person or
group or an object concentrates and
emphasizes, and there are not many
The Nature of Play: Part 1, River
Otters, dir. Gregory Bateson
and Weldon Kees, 1954. Frame
enlargement of river otters
stimulated to play by the direc-
tors. From Bateson EPPI Films,
in the Bateson Collection at 
the Don D. Jackson Archive,
University of Louisiana at
Monroe, accessed spring 2015.
Reproduced with the permis-
sion of the Bateson Idea Group.
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films that deal honestly and directly with real events—films
that permit us to look at human beings as they actually are.42
The notion that minutiae of movement revealed by film could illu-
minate imperceptible psychic realities had appeared widely in the
film theory of the first half of the twentieth century. In the 1930s Walter
Benjamin had developed a memorable theory of the optical uncon-
scious that subverted the Freudian emphasis on language over move-
ment and physiology.43 However, the concept of cybernetic patterns
introduced a powerful framework for rendering this imperceptible
reality legible for therapeutic ends. For Bateson and his colleagues,
uncovering such patterns was the first step in reforming a prevailing
psychiatric gaze dominated by Freudian theories of trauma and
depth. “We made a film in ’49 at Langley-Porter Clinic,” Bateson later
recalled, “of the fact that the minor patterns of interchange in a fam-
ily are the major sources of mental illness. And nobody in ’49 could
look at that film; the [medical] professionals just could not see it.”44
At stake for Bateson were two competing analytics: psychoanalytic
hermeneutics that sought out traces of traumatic repression in dis-
guised forms (malapropisms, rebus-like dream figures, and bungled
actions) versus cybernetic behaviorism that treated discrete com-
municative traces, captured by recording media, as elements in sto-
chastic systems of recursive communication.
Their 1951 Hand-Mouth Coordination: Excerpts from the Feeding
Routine of a One-Year-Old Boy (a preliminary study to Three Families)
documents the emerging features of a cybernetic observation rooted
in celluloid, including gestural patterning, recursive communica-
tions, and a blurring of the distinction between 
system and observer.45 It also displays the enduring
residues of psychoanalytic themes in the emerging
therapeutic modes. Shot by Bateson and Kees in the
suburbs of San Francisco with two portable Bell and
Howell 16 mm cameras, the silent film documents in
excruciating detail interactions among a mother and
her four children, with particular attention paid to
the feeding of the toddler in its high chair.46 Kees’s
careful editing turns this ordinary domestic scene
into a cybernetic system of gestures and gazes trav-
eling among mother, children, and cameramen.47
Feeding time at the kitchen table becomes an almost
obscene display of orifices as relays: hands summon
what mouths swallow, while gazes travel from
mother to toddler to brother and back in a constant
feedback loop. Drawn into this circuit are the 
cameramen and their cameras, whose apertures—
objects of fascination for the children and of mild
Hand-Mouth Coordination, 
dir. Jurgen Ruesch, Gregory
Bateson, and Weldon Kees, 
ca. 1952. Frame enlargements.
Below, top to bottom: Toddler
regards spoon as mother
regards son; son regards cam-
era as cameraman (Kees) films
son. Opposite, top to bottom:
toddler regards camera as
cameraman (Kees) regards
toddler; shot by Kees of
Bateson filming a wider shot 
of the whole family. Faces have
been concealed to protect the
identities of the subjects. 
Video copy of original 16 mm
film courtesy James Reidel and
Henning Engelke. Reproduced
with the permission of the
Bateson Idea Group.
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distress for a self-conscious mother—become channels for transmit-
ting cybernetic signals.
The gestural spacing enabled by Hand-Mouth Coordination dis-
located the protocinematic episteme that informed late-nineteenth-
century science (and lingered on in mid-twentieth-century sciences).48
As noted by film scholar Linda Williams, among others, in the latter
half of the nineteenth century, antecedents of the moving image had
invested scientific knowledge of the living body with distinctly
industrial properties of mechanism, minuteness, and seriality, as in
the running men of Eadweard Muybridge and the hysterical women
documented at Jean-Martin Charcot’s Hôpital de la Salpêtrière.49
Joined to this seriality was an objectivity born of isolating objects
from their social settings and erasing all traces of the documenting
instruments. Scientists enveloped the individual body in an elabo-
rate architecture of what Noam Elcott terms “artificial darkness,” by
which the lively social body became a series of isolated linear trans-
formations.50 From the nineteenth-century culture of moving images,
Bateson and his colleagues inherited a desire to isolate and expose
the aberrant body in unprecedented detail. Small details of move-
ment became durable documents for close examination. Moreover,
as at the Salpêtrière, the Palo Alto films and tapes served a trinity of
museological, pedagogical, and analytical purposes—that is, as an
archive of aberrancy, as illustrations for instructional purposes, and
as instruments of observation.51
However, for the spatial procedures of seriality, isolation, and
enclosure that governed the late-nineteenth-century protocinematic
regime, Bateson and his colleagues substituted a distinctly cyber-
netic logic of recursivity, interaction, and expanding
networks. They turned to film and audio to delineate
patterns that did not inhere in a particular body or
space but disclosed themselves in circulation among
multiple bodies that were tethered to recording
instruments. Objective scientific authority gave way
to an involvement and complicity demonstrated by
the camera and its operators’ appearance in the films.
In Bateson and his colleagues’ films, roving cameras
and ordinary kitchen lights dispelled artificial dark-
ness and traced an ontology of interrelatedness irre-
ducible to any single body. Whereas Charcot sought
to extract the mentally ill from their families and
thereby build a stronger psyche in the safe confines
of a clinic, affiliates of the Palo Alto Group con-
densed and magnified the family circuit to produce
an ecological account of mental health. As one prac-
titioner of these methods later noted,
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Family therapy will take over psychiatry in one or two decades,
because it is about man in context. It is a therapy that belongs
to our century, while individual therapy belongs to the nine-
teenth century. . . . Family therapy is to psychiatry what Pinter
is to theatre and ecology is to natural science.52
Infrastructural Spacing
As if impelled by the centrifugal motion drawing mental illness out
of the individual body into a widening gyre of associations, the doc-
umentary films of Bateson, Kees, and Ruesch quit the clinic to tour
suburban living rooms and kitchens. This turn toward the suburbs
participated in a wider effort to assign the nuclear family and the
suburban home with the task of ordering postwar social life—what
historian Ellen Herman characterizes as “an insistent [postwar] 
ideology of patriarchal domesticity [that] simultaneously returned
civilian jobs to male veterans and sequestered women and children
in a familial bubble.”53 In the course of the late 1940s and early 1950s
the postwar suburb, in tandem with an expanding network of veter-
ans’ hospitals and mental health services, emerged as a mainstay in
the societal infrastructures charged with overcoming the social dis-
locations of the Great Depression and World War II, and also acting
as a dynamic buffer guarding against the kinds of brittle mentalities
seen as having facilitated the rise of fascism in Europe. 
From this perspective, the Palo Alto Apparatus joined an ensem-
ble of media-technical forms and flows—including television, sub-
urban developments, highways, and new architectural forms such as
the picture window—bringing the white middle class to the suburbs.
It allowed regimes of geographic spatialization, as well as economic
and ethnic segregation, that served as the phantasmatic foundations
of a new variety of family-centered postwar domesticity. Moreover,
family therapy’s emphasis on the home as the site for nurturing per-
sonality and the role of “the schizophrenogenic mother” in produc-
ing mental illness aligned it with a coterie of postwar technologies
of gender that produced the home as a site of feminine care and
semipublic “workplaces” as a site of masculine labor.54
The ethnographic tendency in the documentary films shot by
Bateson and his colleagues inflects them with a certain ideological
undecidability; they are at once exemplifications of the postwar
ideal and self-consciously distantiated documents of its historically
specific, pathological contingencies. In effect, the films—which
included mothers caring for their children, parents dining with chil-
dren in the kitchen, and scenes of the family receiving neighbors 
in the family room—offered ethnographies of the mentalities (and
relative resiliencies) peculiar to the architecture and infrastructure
of postwar suburban sprawl.55 Ultimately, a specific ideological
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stance on the contents of the films is ceded to a cybernetic formalism
substituting spatial expanse for critical and historical depths. In this
way, the early films shot by Bateson, Ruesch, and Kees took part in
producing what Mark Poster describes as “a horizontal theory that
illuminated the surface expanse of the patient’s family life.”56 The
sprawling space of the suburbs became constitutive of the horizon-
tal surface of a new theoretical paradigm.
Three Families traces this suburban topos and its role in the
medial production of racialized, gendered, and class differentiation.
Consisting mostly of ethnographic documentation of families at home,
it evokes the postwar fascination with the nuclear family as a basic
unit of national strength and health; however, it may equally be read as
a document of the role played by social science and suburban infra-
structures in fabricating that family.57 This making-of-the-family
involved an ingenious incorporation of postwar California’s sprawling
suburban infrastructures into the emerging theoretical frameworks of
family therapy. The network of highways, electrical grids, and broad-
casting systems that facilitated the manufacture of a racially and 
economically segregated suburban utopia (i.e., the idea rather than
the actuality of such a place), produced family structures suitable for
description as semiautonomous and self-contained cybernetic sys-
tems.58 Unlike the extended families identified with neighborhoods
labeled “urban” and “ethnic,” the suburban families of Menlo Park
and Palo Alto permitted easy delineation as free-standing, semiau-
tonomous systems. In effect, the infrastructural spacing of postwar
America produced economies of psychic circulation that came to
define the family as a social system. Architecture and infrastructure
entered into the technological constitution of the cybernetic family.
Communication and Interaction performs this intertwining of 
gestural, infrastructural, psychic, and ethnic ecologies. “This film
was made in San Francisco during the year of 1951,” a narrator
intones over opening scenes of the city center, “and deals with three
West Coast middle class families whom we shall call the Hoffmans,
the Peters, and the Bergs.” Scenes of the city center that open the film
give way to a car ride as the two cameramen, Bateson and Kees,
travel via highway to a suburban enclave. Skyscrapers and urban
projects give way to freestanding homes accessible by motorway and
automobile. With the leaving behind of the city, the film—and
indeed family therapy itself—is en route to an inventory of modes of
living sustained by the suburbs. This passage from city center to sub-
urb models the changing workplaces of Bateson and his colleagues,
as their work started at San Francisco’s urban Langley Porter Clinic
in the late 1940s but then increasingly centered on family therapy
conducted in suburban Palo Alto and Menlo Park in the 1950s. This
cinematic passage also theatricalizes the migration of the postwar
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American family itself, as ideals of the white suburban enclave took
hold of the postwar cultural imaginary.
Three Families, like the later work of the Palo Alto Group, ambiva-
lently recognizes the contingency of ethnic, racial, and gendered
codes it documents. On the one hand, a voice-over announces that
the film will concentrate on the analysis of families of “Anglo-Saxon”
and “German-Jewish” descent. This detail is again in keeping with
the methods of the culture-and-personality school of anthropology,
which identified personality traits with national and ethnic inculca-
tion. In Communication: The Social Matrix of Psychiatry, the Swiss
Ruesch and the English Bateson underscored the peculiarly
American qualities of the families and mentalities they described.59
However, this historically contingent family formation and its
belonging to a specific phase of the built world slides into unmarked
universalism as images of a painted nativity scene of Mary, Joseph,
and Jesus accompany the narration:
The film was shot in the belief that in a careful record of what
some mothers and children do, it might be possible to observe
the various means of communication which the children learn
through every detail of the mother’s action. But the actions of
parents are also responses to how they perceive the children.
The family thus becomes a unit.
The result is a historicization of ethnic grouping and practices
enveloped by a universalization of an ethnically unmarked, hetero-
normative (and Christian) nuclear family as a transhistorical build-
ing block of society.60
Juxtaposing the families’ bathing, dressing, and playing in Three
Families with movies Bateson and Mead shot in
Bali in the 1930s brings into relief the specificity
of architecture as a factor in these descriptions
of the family.61 Whereas the ethnographic films
of mothers bathing their children in Bali unfold
beneath the open sky and in an unenclosed
space that allows acquaintances to peer in,
enabling an almost seamless cutting-together of
footage that features neighboring mothers and
children from across the tribe, the suburban
scenes of the Hoffmans, Peters, and Bergs
develop in the closed space of a suburban bath-
room, where only mother, children, and camera-
men enter into the ecology of communication
and interaction. The freestanding suburban
home and its media of walls, doors, and stair-
wells circumscribe association, strictly regulat-
Top: Bathing Babies in Three
Cultures, dir. Margaret Mead
and Gregory Bateson, 1954.
Washing a Balinese baby in the
open air and in the company of
neighbors. Frame enlargement.
Bottom: Communication and
Interaction in Three Families,
dir. Jurgen Ruesch, Gregory
Bateson, and Weldon Kees,
1952. Washing a baby in the
enclosed space of the postwar
American suburbs. Frame
enlargement. Reproduced with
the permission of the Bateson
Idea Group.
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ing who enters and who leaves and imposing a sharp delimitation
between each family
Complementing the half hour of calm, domestic scenes that rep-
resent the so-called normal families featured in Three Families are
hours of never-released medical footage of “abnormal” families, shot
in hopes of documenting and diagnosing the production of mental
illness. There the walls of the family home—presented as neutral
and inoffensive in Three Families—are disclosed as agents in the
often malignant configuration of libidinal economies. In filmed one-
on-one sessions between the therapist and the mother of one Palo
Alto family (who had sought treatment after seeing a public screen-
ing of Communication and Interaction in Three Families), the 
distraught woman complains of the unendurable loneliness she
experiences at home, recounting the pain caused by long absences of
her husband and son from the house and declaring, “I’d like to throw
rocks through the window . . . [and] tear the walls down.”62 Paired
with this agonizing isolation are its unsettling disruptions: she
reports distressing phone calls from her husband, visits from an
intrusive neighbor, and the overbearing presence of Bateson and his
cameraman as incidents unsettling domesticity. Suburban Palo Alto
provides a topos for the distribution of this existential dread, and the
nuclear family a circuit for its articulation.
Cybernetic Aesthetics
The gestural and infrastructural spacing in the films of Bateson and
his associates culminated in a cybernetic aesthetics born of the
wartime instruments and techniques that circulated in postwar
America. In broad strokes, the cybernetic aesthetic consisted of an
amalgamation of human and machine perception in recursive and
mathematically patterned series. The cybernetic aesthetic repur-
posed the functional patterns of mathematics as objects for aesthetic
reflection in their own right. Though most easily characterized by
the introduction of wartime communications technologies (such as
radar, oscilloscopes, and information-theoretical methods of analysis)
into artistic production, social-scientific investigation into human
perception and organization arguably played the more decisive role
in its constitution.
This cybernetic aesthetics emerged from a hybridization of engi-
neering and social scientific innovation produced by the mobiliza-
tion of engineers and social scientists in joint endeavors during
World War II. In wartime, engineers applied cryptography, oper -
ations research, analog and digital computers, servomechanisms, and
radar to the mathematical recognition of patterns that exceeded
native human perceptual and cognitive faculties. Phenomena such
as missile and plane trajectories and strings of words and sounds
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transmitted across long distances became mathematically governed
series, grids, and probabilities accessible by machine-aided inter-
vention. Social scientists such as Kurt Lewin, Alexander Bavelas,
and J.J. Gibson, meanwhile, devised psychological theories and
training films capable of integrating human and machinic percep-
tion. After the war the experiments of artists and social scientists
alike repurposed this knowledge for aesthetic ends.63
Characteristics of cybernetic aesthetics emerged in fields of 
conceptual labor and in flows of experimental practice opened up
through the dissemination of wartime technologies in the civilian
sphere. At the conceptual level, Three Families explicitly locates
itself within the postwar technoscientific field of conceptual labors
reorganizing knowledge according to cybernetics. Shots of Shannon
and Warren Weaver’s The Mathematical Theory of Communication,
Wiener’s Cybernetics: Or Control and Communication in the Animal
and the Machine, and Gibson’s The Perception of the Visual World
invite the viewer into an informational ontology wherein proto -
algorithmic processes govern language, industry, human-machine 
systems, biology, and vision.64 These works provided analytical
methods that rendered Three Communications intelligible as an
effort to map out human interaction as communicative patterns. At
the same time, the film endeavored to inscribe itself within this
field—not as popularization but as a conceptual peer to take part in
the interdisciplinary field of communications wherein concepts
from engineering, social science, and other fields circu-
late. An additional shot of Bateson and Ruesch’s own
Communication: The Social Matrix of Psychiatry
announces the filmmakers’ intention to place mental
health squarely along the axis of interdisciplinary infor-
mational sciences.
The first frames of Three Families, which feature the
phrase “Kinesis presents,” provide clues to the flows of
experimental practice to which the film belonged.
Founded around 1951, Kinesis, Inc., distributed experi-
mental films to festivals and college campuses. The
company’s distribution not only of Three Families but
also of experimental animations such as Divertissement
Rococo (1952) by Hy Hirsh and Caravan (1952) by Jordan
Belson located it squarely in San Francisco’s avant-
garde art scene (much traveled by Bateson and Kees)
that blurred the lines between scientific and artistic
experiment through the repurposing of wartime tech-
nologies.65 Divertissement Rococo employed an oscillo-
scope and optical printer of Hirsh’s own construction to
produce a symphony of abstract patterns and shapes
Hy Hirsh. Divertissement
Rococo, 1951. Frame enlarge-
ments from 16 mm color film
with sound, produced with 
an oscilloscope. Academy of
Motion Picture Arts and Sciences
Film Archive, Hollywood, CA.
Reproduced with the permis-
sion of Angeline Pike.
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generated by mathematical ratios. Kinesis, Inc., advertised the film
as “an amazing display of completely controlled colors, lines and
shapes,” crediting it with “translating music into light and color.”66
Belson would later incorporate Hirsh’s work with the oscilloscope
into his own work, most notably combining it with electronic music
at the Vortex V concerts. This experimental scene rested upon the
postwar proliferation of magnetic tape, oscilloscopes, and other elec-
tronics enabled by surplus and refashioned cast-off war technolo-
gies. This appropriation of wartime technologies is perhaps best
known from the films of John Whitney, an artist whose 1946 appear-
ance in the San Francisco Museum of Art’s landmark Art and
Cinema exhibition directly informed the film practice of Hirsh and
Belson.67 Whitney recalls making his oscilloscope-driven films by
purchasing “mechanical junk excreted from army depots across the
country . . . [including] antiaircraft specialized analog ballistic prob-
lem solver computers dating back to World War II.”68 As discussed
by Zabet Patterson, technologies devised to render the chaos of
wartime combat into orderly, predictable patterns thus became the
means for an aesthetic retraining of civilian perceptual apparatuses.  
In the case of Three Families, however, what transformed vision
was not a discrete media technology like the oscilloscope, but rather
a media-technical amalgamation of cybernetics, information theory,
and the federally funded veterans’ hospital combined within a sin-
gle apparatus of therapeutic visions. At first glance, the scenes of
families in Three Families may look quite different from the experi-
mental films of Hirsh and Whitney. The former offers an almost
quaint representation of American families at home, while the films
of Hirsh and Whitney were composed entirely of abstract forms gen-
erated by the informational properties of oscilloscope and computers.
However, the observational techniques of Three Families turned the
observer away from the figural bodies of parents and children and
toward abstract informational patterns of “communication” and
“interaction.” As the narrator of the film explains, “the film is not a
record of dramatic events but of small repetitive patterns. These
repeated patterns whose cumulative effect contributes to character
formation are implicit statements about human relations.” Thus,
while the film presents what may be
construed as charming domestic
scenes, it is not, in fact, a depiction
of mothers bathing and dressing
children, nor is it even a portrayal
of families; instead, it is the presen-
tation of a particular apparatus 
of communication—namely, the
American family—transmitting its
Communication and Interaction
in Three Families, dir. Jurgen
Ruesch, Gregory Bateson, and
Weldon Kees, 1952. Frame
enlargement. Example of “small
repetitive patterns” to instruct
viewers on what to look for in
the films of families interacting
at home. Reproduced with 
the permission of the Bateson 
Idea Group.
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signals via small repetitive patterns of exchange.
The cybernetic eye that transformed sentimental scenes of domes-
tic family life into a spectacle of surface, signal, and noise laid the
foundations for the informatic approach to family therapy. Bateson’s
cybernetic cinema bracketed out meaning and intentionality to
showcase the depthless relay of technical signals. “Every expressive
movement, action sequence, or word is,” the narrator explains,
“among other things, a message telling the receiver how to interpret
other messages. It is in fact a message about communication.” So it
is across all the films produced by the Palo Alto Group. The meta-
communicative signals of “approaches and leavetakings” (as Kees
and Ruesch titled one 1955 film) replaced the existential depth of
welcoming and departing. Likewise, in Hand-Mouth Coordination,
stereotypically Freudian oral fixations of a baby and mother com-
peting over the insertion of spoon into a mouth are transformed into
an exemplary trial of cybernetic targeting based on real-time coordi-
nation of hand and eye to reach the destination.69 This cybernetic
aesthetics recomposed the nuclear family as a primary node for con-
figuring the relay of signals and for regulating the production of the
psychic self alongside its traffic with the outside world. Sustaining
this analytical determination was the suburban home that config-
ured the available channels for interaction. Scenes of neighbors
approaching and leaving by side doors and of cars delivering and
evacuating persons unfurl as patterns demanding informatic parsing
by scientists and their cameras—at least until the arrival of antici-
pated computing machines capable of reducing this vast visual labor
to a simple matter of zeroes and ones.
The Bastards of the Cybernetic Family
This centrifugal motion—whereby the site of communication shifts
from semantic content to embedded patterns of communications—
allowed family therapy as a field to divorce itself from the textual
hermeneutics and inner mentalities favored by psychoanalysis and
to become a formal science of observing and ultimately engineering
adaptive systems of communication in the family.70 After the 1955
suicide of Kees and the nonrenewal of a Rockefeller Foundation
grant, Bateson refocused his efforts around the suburban Palo Alto
Veterans Administration Hospital. Together with Jackson, Haley,
Weakland, and William Fry, he developed means for making the
suburban family at home in interview rooms outfitted with audio
recorders, film cameras, and one-way mirrors. This collaboration
adapted media techniques forged with Ruesch and Kees in the late
1940s and early 1950s into the cybernetic system of inscription,
analysis, and therapeutic feedback that came to dominate family
therapy and define the Palo Alto Group. By 1962 (the year Bateson
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left the Palo Alto Group), the early experiment was becoming a rec-
ognized method, with efforts to reproduce their work taking root in
experimental clinics across the United States.
However, even more influential than the Palo Alto Apparatus was
its unanticipated offspring on the political left and right. Cybernetic
therapy seemed to offer solutions to right-wing, left-wing, and tech-
nocratic agendas for mental health reform. The notion that the 
private nuclear family—rather than governments or society—was the
proper custodian of mental health met with broad approval in Cold
War America, which held up the private family as a counterforce to
communist collectivism. From the right, Ronald Reagan’s first major
political speech, the 1961 long-playing record Ronald Reagan Speaks
Out against Socialized Medicine, provided an ideological outline for
attacks on state-funded, institutionalized health care. Reagan opposed
the well-being of the family and private industry to the supposed
threats posed by social security. Reagan instructed an imagined wife
and mother to think of the freedoms their sons and husbands would
lose if their own professions became subject to government regula-
tion. His address found a receptive audience in California, where the
work of the Palo Alto Group had already sown seeds of doubt about
large state-run mental health care facilities and turned the public’s
attention to fathers, mothers, and the local community.
From the political left, antipsychiatrists including Thomas Szasz,
David Cooper, and R.D. Laing found in the double-bind hypothesis
support for their argument that mental illness constituted resistance
to an oppressive society. Seizing upon the Palo Alto Group’s 1950s
and 1960s studies of schizophrenia as a map of group-based dys-
functions, first Laing and later French philosopher Gilles Deleuze
and psychoanalyst Félix Guattari wrote conceptual elegies to the
schizophrenic’s ability to lay bare the paradoxes gripping capitalist
society. The conceptual legacy of this work resounded in the echelons
of postmodern theory, where the likes of Jean Baudrillard and Fredric
Jameson embraced the critical diagnosis
of schizophrenia as a register of conflict
in communicative capitalism.
Often lost on the later disciples of
Deleuze and Guattari was the intimate
relation of this work to the media-tech-
nical refashioning of psychic manage-
ment. As Guattari once recalled, “[m]y
first work as a psychotherapist was with
a schizophrenic, using a tape recorder,”
attesting to the more mundane clinical
circumstances of Palo Alto–inflected
therapy in which his celebrated attack
American Medical Association.
Ronald Reagan Speaks Out
against Socialized Medicine,
1961. Cover of LP record.
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with Deleuze on psychoanalysis, Anti-Oedipus, took form.71 Seemingly
lost on the advocates of anti-Oedipal schizoanalysis themselves was
their complicity with the emerging neoliberalization of health care.
In an ironic alliance, these two movements laid ideological founda-
tions in the United States for a broad-based movement to devolve
health care, first from urban asylums to the community clinics of the
1960s and later to the privately run flophouses of 1970s deinstitu-
tionalization.72 So it was that the radical proponents of “schizo cul-
ture” and “schizoanalysis” found themselves metaphorically standing
outsides the gates of empty asylums, demanding the inmates be 
set free.
Moreover, the proposition that modest technical adjustments
could resolve long-standing mental illnesses exerted broad appeal in
a nation whose demands for mental health care in the latter half of
the twentieth century displayed no limits. In 1967, Bateson’s former
colleagues and students in Palo Alto established the Brief Therapy
Center, which adapted the lessons of family therapy for the treatment
of patients identified as suffering from a dearth of “time, money,
intelligence, persistence, and verbal sophistication.”73 Dubbed by
critics “therapy in the age of Reaganomics” and “Reagapeutics,” brief
therapy sought to identify and modify at the individual level observ-
able systems of feedback identified as systemic logical distortion
responsible for mental illness.74 In lieu of the vast machinery of 
cameras, transcriptions, mirrors, and microphones, brief therapy
returned to the simple cybernetic system of therapist, notebook, and
patient. In doctrinaire form it afforded no more than ten or twelve
sessions of intensive work in which to identify and adjust aberrations
in communications. By taking funds formerly directed to institu-
tionalization and psychoanalysis and earmarking them for brief 
therapy and its spinoffs (e.g., cognitive behavioral therapy), health
maintenance organizations (HMOs) and state health care systems
thereby became the principle apparatus for disseminating stripped-
down cybernetics to the salaried masses.75
Media History as Cybernetic Kinship
The history of the cybernetic family and its media-technical fash-
ioning extends but also complicates our understanding of the role
played by media in the remaking of domestic life after World War II.
For some time now it has been a pillar of cultural history that after
World War II electronic media, particularly television, provided
technical support for fashioning the suburban home into a semi -
autonomous privatized space (what Raymond Williams termed “mobile
privatization”) with profound implications for the production of a
“separable family.”76 Media historian Lynn Spigel demonstrates how,
in the 1940s and 1950s, “white middle-class concepts of gender,
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class, and generational difference” shaped the social construction of
television as technology for the management of this historically spe-
cific regime of family life.77 In this way Spigel and other feminist 
historians have shown how historically specific fantasies about the
family bore down on the constitution of media technologies.78
The history of the cybernetic family reveals that the inverse is also
true; that is, that historically specific fantasies about technology, and
technology itself, bore down on the reconstitution of the American
family. This reconstitution was not enacted by a rudimentary tech-
nological determinism whereby the arrival of electronic media in the
home simply compelled new forms of private association. Instead,
as the history of the cybernetic family shows, it came about indi-
rectly, as new modes of knowledge and analysis born of wartime
technologies reformed social science and other institutions for the
management of postwar life. As this process of cybernetic reform
unfolded, it intermingled with a wider range technical forms such as
architecture, infrastructure, and educational film.
The manufacture of the cybernetic family may serve as an allegory
for the task of the media historian. Insofar as the cybernetic family
belongs to a chapter of media history, it suggests the latter is about
more than reconstructions of specific media (e.g., radio, television,
film, computing) and their interactions with, or constitution through,
a predefined social context. Neither cybernetics, film, nor social con-
struction provides a basis on its own for the production of cybernetic
families. Rather, the cybernetic family came into being through the
manufacture of kinships—that is, through the forging of affiliations,
exchanges, and alliances that are not genetic but genealogical in
character, and which are composed as much of instruments and
inscriptions as by humans and their cultural practices.79 This strate-
gic configuration of elements—rather than a medium or a techno-
logical invention—allowed for the production of the cybernetic
family as well as the forging of a new apparatus for the psychic 
management of its members. The history of that family suggests the
proper subject of media history is not so much “media,” “industries,”
“economy,” or “social forces” as the strategic configuration of these
heterogeneous elements into a self-reproducing apparatus.80 In this
sense, those living today under the sway of managed health care may
find themselves to be extended members of a cybernetic family, pop-
ulated with machines, data, policies, and pictures whose multifari-
ous composition falls squarely within the mandate of the media
historian.
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